CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARCH
ENTRY

To

INSTALL ELECTRONIC

AND

SEIZURE-COVERT

EAVESDROPPING DEVICES IS

SUBSUMED IN A VALID TITLE III EAVESDROPPING ORDER,

Dalia

v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979).
Lawrence Dalia was found guilty of two counts of transporting,
receiving, and possessing stolen goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371
and 18 U.S.C. § 2315.1 Evidence obtained by interception of oral
communications in Dalia's private office pursuant to a valid court authorization was introduced. 2 The installation of the requisite electronic listening device was accomplished by means of a forcible,
3
surreptitious entry.
The events leading to Dalia's conviction began on March 14,
1973, when United States District Court Judge Frederick B. Lacey
authorized the interception of calls from two telephones at Mr.
Dalia's place of business for a period of twenty days. 4 Upon expiration of this period, the government requested an extension of the
wiretap order 5 and authorization to intercept all oral communications. 6 On April 5, 1973, the order authorizing interception of oral
communications within the business premises of Lawrence Dalia was
granted. 7 There was no reference to the method of interception to
1 United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862, 863 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d
Cir. 1978), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979).
2 Dalia v. United States, 99 S. Ct. at 1687. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976), authorizes interception of "oral communications" pursuant to court order.
Professor Westin, writing for Columbia Law Review, summarized the various techniques,
both currently available and under development, which may be utilized to intercept oral communications. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposalsfor the 1970's, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 1003, 1006-07 (1966). These techniques include "building sub-miniature radio
transmitters into . . . clothing or personal effects," "[m]icrophones the size of a sugar cube"
which can be activated by remote control, "contact microphones," "[dlirectional microphones,"
"ultrasonic waves," and "windowpanes ... coated with a transparent radar-reflecting coating
which allows sensitive radar equipment to monitor from considerable distances the vibrations
caused by conversations." Id. at 1006-08.
3 99 S. Ct. at 1687. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, is silent regarding both the manner of installation and the degree of
court supervision required when carrying out the court order.
" 99 S. Ct. at 1685. Judge Lacey granted the original wiretap authorization, the authorization to intercept oral communications, and all of the extensions. 426 F. Supp. at 865. He also
presided at the trial and the hearing on the motion to suppress. Id. at 863, 872.
5 99 S. Ct. at 1685-86. The federal wiretap statute provides for extensions of wiretap orders upon a showing that probable cause still exists. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
6 99 S. Ct. at 1686.
7 Id. Reports concerning all intercepted conversations were required to be submitted to
the court every five days. Id. Title III authorizes the judge to require periodic progress reports.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(6).
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be utilized nor was there specific authorization for surreptitious entry
to effect placement of the listening devices. 8
Shortly after issuance of the order, special agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) broke into the office of Lawrence
Dalia. 9 They placed a microphone in the ceiling of the office, 10
enabling the FBI to listen to all conversations in the office. There was
no court supervision of the method of installation. 1 At the end of
the twenty day period, the government again requested and obtained
an extension of the court order. 12 On May 16, 1973, agents reentered Lawrence Dalia's office and removed the electronic listening
device. 13
Prior to trial a motion to suppress the results of the electronic
surveillance was made. ' 4 The defendant contended that the breaking
and entering was a violation of the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution. 15 His basic theory was that specific and prior
8 575 F.2d at 1345. The order to intercept oral communications authorized FBI agents to:
Intercept oral communications of Larry Dalia, and others as yet unknown, concerning the above-described offenses at the business office of Larry Dalia, ...
situated in the north westernly corner of a one-story building housing Wrap-OMatic Machinery Company, Ltd., and Precise Packaging, and located at 1105 West
St. George Avenue, Linden, New Jersey.
99 S. Ct. at 1686 n.4.
A review of the case law in this area reveals a distinct split of authority regarding the
necessity for such judicial authorization. See United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir.
1978); United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d
633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 903 (1978); Application of the United States, 563 F.2d
637 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v.
Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977).
9 99 S. Ct. at 1687. The initial break-in was accomplished by three agents entering through
a window. Id. at 1696 (Stevens, J., dissenting). They were in the building for two or three
hours and spent a considerable portion of this time conducting a search of the "entire building
for 'safety' reasons." Brief for Petitioner at 7, Dalia v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner].
'0 99 S. Ct. at 1687.
1 Id. at 1696 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Notwithstanding the lack of supervision, the trial

court held that a surreptitious entry to effect the installation of the listening device was within
contemplation when the order authorizing the interception was issued. 426 F. Supp. at 866.
12 99 S. Ct. at 1686.
13 Id. at 1687. At the post-trial hearing to suppress the results of the electronic surveillance,
one of the agents who had participated in the entries admitted that no reports had been prepared concerning his activities and that there had been no direct supervision of his mode of
operation by the court, the Department of Justice, or the United States Attorney's Office. Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 7.
14 99 S. Ct. at 1687.

15 575 F.2d at 1345.
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
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judicial authorization was necessary to effect a surreptitious entry. 16
This motion was not heard until after the conclusion of the trial. 17 At
8
that time the motion was denied.'
The defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit asserting a violation of the fourth amendment.' 9 The Third Circuit affirmed the decision, holding, without
dissent, that authorization to break and enter is subsumed in a war20
rant for interception of oral communications.
In affirming the lower court decision, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that breaking and entering to execute an otherwise valid Title III eavesdropping order does not violate the fourth
amendment 2 ' and that the method of execution of the order is within
the province of law enforcement officials, subject only to a sub-

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Conversations have not always been viewed as falling within the purview of the fourth
amendment. Prior to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the fourth amendment was
considered to be inapplicable to conversations. United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d at 458-59. In
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment was to be read literally and, therefore, its protection applied only to physical objects. Id. at 464-65. Accordingly, absent physical invasion, wiretapping could not result in a
violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 466.
In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1940), the Supreme Court affirmed its holding
in Olmstead that speech was not protected by the fourth amendment where there has been no

physical trespass. Id. at 135.
16 575 F.2d at 1345.
17 99 S. Ct. at 1687. A jury verdict was returned on June 18, 1976 and the evidentiary
hearing was not held until July 29, 1976. 426 F. Supp. at 863.
18 99 S.Ct. at 1687. Judge Lacey found that surreptitious entry was within the contemplation of the court. 426 F. Supp. at 866. In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge stated:
On this set of facts, I find that the safest and most successful methods of accomplishing the installation of the wiretapping device was through breaking and
entering the premises in question. Dalia in fact stated that, to the best of his
knowledge, it would be impossible to install such a device in that locaticn without
gaining access to the building forcibly .... In most cases the only form of installing
such devices is through breaking and entering. The nature of the act is such that
entry must be surreptitious and must not arouse suspicion, and the installation must
be done without the knowledge of the residents or occupants.
Id. (citation omitted).
19575 F.2d at 1345.
20 Id. at 1346. The court did, however, recognize the desirability of prior judicial authorization by stating that "[i]n the future, the more prudent or preferable approach for government
agents would be to include a statement regarding the need of a surreptitious entry in a request
for the interception of oral communications when a break-in is contemplated." Id. at 1346-47.
The Supreme Court decision in Dalia explicitly agreed with this suggestion. 99 S.Ct. at 1694
n.22.
21 99 S. Ct. at 1689.
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sequent judicial determination of reasonableness. 2 2 The decision was
based on the legislative history of Title 1 123 and on an interpretation
24
of the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (Title III) authorizes the interception of oral communications by
law enforcement personnel pursuant to a valid court order.2 5 The
procedure mandated by the statute includes the identity of the officer
27
26
empowered to seek authorization, the contents of the application,
the criteria to be applied by the judge, 2 the requirement of particu22 Id. at 1694. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens criticized this part of the holding.
Id. at 1696 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He contended that law enforcement officials are required
by the fourth amendment to obtain prior legislative or judicial authorization in order to meet
the standard of reasonableness.
I feel that the Court's holding may reflect an unarticulated presumption that national police officers have the power to carry out a surveillance order by whatever
means may be necessary unless explicitly prohibited by the statute or by the Constitution.
Id. at 1704-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The majority opinion considered a determination of reasonableness subsequent to the entry
to be sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements. Id. at 1694.
23 Id.

at 1689.
24 Id. at 1694.

25 Title III was enacted as a direct response to the Supreme Court decisions in Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). S. REP. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112. For a
detailed discussion of these cases, see note 36 infra.
The constitutionality of Title III has never been directly decided by the Supreme Court.
See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 150 (1974) (question of constitutionality specifically
excluded from consideration); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308
(1972) (no constitutional challenge). However, the Court has allowed the admission of evidence
obtained under Title III. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); United States v.
Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974). In addition, there are several lower court cases which have held
that the statute complies with the standards set forth in Berger and is, therefore, constitutional.
See, e.g., United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973);
United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United
States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir.
1971).
26 18 U.S.C. § 2516. Application must be made by "[t]he Attorney General, or any Assistant
Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General" or by "[t]he principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision
thereof," provided such prosecuting attorney would qualify under the local statute. Id.
§ 2516(1), (2).
27 Id. § 2518. The application must disclose the identity of the officer applying for the court
order, id. § 2518(1)(a), the particular details relating to the offense, location and type of communication, id. § 2518(1)(b), the prior history of the investigation, id. § 2518(1)(c), and the
relevant time frame, id. § 2518(1)(d).
28 Id. § 2518(3). In order to authorize electronic surveillance, the judge must determine the
existence of probable cause for belief that a specific enumerated offense is involved, id.
§ 2518(3)(a), and that the interception will yield information concerning that offense, id.
§2518(3)(b).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:424

larity,2 9 the time limitations on the authorization, 3 0 the procedure for
32
obtaining extensions, 3 ' the comprehensive reporting requirements,
the standards for attack, 33 and the sanctions to be applied in the
event of non-compliance. 3 4 In addition, Title III prohibits the "manufacture, distribution, possession, and advertising of wire or oral
communication intercepting devices" to members of the general public. 3 5

Title III was enacted in response to judicial decisions declaring
speech to be an area protected by the fourth amendment, 36 and a

29

Id.

§ 2518(4).

Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire or oral communication shall specify(a) the identity of the person . ..
(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities ...
(c) a particular description of the type of communication .. .
(d) the identity of the agency authorized
(e) the period of time ....
Id.
30

Id. § 2518(5). Both authorizations and extensions are limited to a maximum of thirty days.

Id.
31 Id. Extensions must meet the same standards as the original order. Id. See notes 27 and
28 supra.
32 18 U.S.C. § 2519. Three separate reports are required: 1) from the issuing judge to the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 2) from the Attorney General or the "principal prosecuting attorney of a State" or "any political subdivision of a State" to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and 3) from the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts to the Congress. Id. The contents of these reports is specifically
described in the statute. Id.
3' The statute not only provides for a motion to suppress evidence acquired by interception
of wire or oral communications, id. § 2518(10) but also allows the recovery of civil damages, id.
§ 2520.
'4 Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal interception of wire or oral communications
must be suppressed. Id. § 2515.
35 Id.
36 In Berger v. New York, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to bribe the Chairman
of the New York State Liquor Authority. 388 U.S. at 44. Evidence had been obtained by planting a bug in a lawyer's office in compliance with the state wiretapping statute, N.Y. CODE
CliM. PROC. § 813-a (McKinney 1942). 388 U.S. at 45. The central issue in Berger was whether
the state statute complied with the mandates of the fourth amendment. Id. at 54, 62-63. The
Court first reaffirmed the fact that the fourth amendment is applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 53. Next the Court analyzed the statute
in light of the requirements of the fourth amendment, resulting in the determination that the
statute was overly broad, id. at 54, and did not meet the constitutionally mandated standard of
particularity, id.at 55-56. This lack of particularity required a holding that the statute was
invalid. Id.
The most important aspect of the decision in Berger is the careful exposition of the factors
which the Court will examine in determining the validity of an electronic surveillance statute.
In order to comply with the fourth amendment there must be a "neutral and detached" magistrate, id. at 54, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(9), 2516, a determination of probable cause, 388 U.S. at
55, see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a),(b), and particularity, 388 U.S. at 55-56, see 18 U.S.C.
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sentiment among the general population that more aggressive forms
of crime control were necessary to combat crime in a modern society. 3 7 The drafters of the Act were attempting to accomplish two
purposes: "(1) [to] protect the privacy of wire and oral communications, and (2) [to] delineat[e] on a uniform basis the circumstances
and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized." 38 Moreover, Congress specifically
attempted to draft this legislation in conformance with the protections
afforded by the fourth amendment, 3 9 while permitting law enforcement agencies to utilize the technology available in the electronic
surveillance area.
The legislative history clearly indicates that the resultant statute
was intended to be a comprehensive scheme for control of wiretapping and eavesdropping. 40 Further evidence of this legislative intent

§ 2518(1)(bXi), (ii), (iii). Moreover, the time period must not be excessive, 388 U.S. at 59, see 18
U.S.C. § 2518(1)(d), (4)(e), (5), extensions must be grounded on probable cause, 388 U.S. at 59,
see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5), and notice must be given, 388 U.S. at 60, see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).
These were the standards that Congress used as guidelines in enacting Title III. S. REP. No.
1097, supra note 25, at 2161-63.
In Katz v. United States, the FBI had attached a recording device to the exterior of a
public telephone booth. 389 U.S. at 348. There was no physical trespass. Id. at 349. The
petitioner's conversations were recorded and used as evidence. Id. at 348. The Court declined
to decide this case on the notion of "'constitutionally protected area,' " id. at 350, and instead
held that
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
Id. at 351. The test is not based on property concepts but rather on a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Id. at 352-53. Moreover, the Court specifically rejected the trespass rationale enunciated in Olmstead and Goldman. 389 U.S. at 353. For a discussion of this rationale, see note 15
supra.
31 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 25, at 2154. For a discussion of the social forces which
were acting on the members of Congress, see Note, FederalDecisions On The Constitutionality
Of Electronic Surveillance Legislation, 11 AM. CssiM. L. REv. 639 (1973).
38 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 25, at 2153; 114 CONG. REC. 11613 (1968) (remarks of Sen.
Thurmond); id. at 14470 (exchange between Sen. Lausche and Sen. McClellan).
39 In discussing the purposes of Title III, Senate Report Number 1097 states:
To assure the privacy of oral and wire communications, title III prohibits all
wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law
enforcement officers engaged in the investigation or prevention of specified types of
serious crimes, and only after authorization of a court order obtained after a showing and finding of probable cause.
S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 25, at 2153. For a discussion of the competing interests necessitating a federal wiretapping statute, see Greenawalt, Wiretapping and Bugging: Striking a
Balance Between Privacy and Law Enforcement, 50 JUDICATURE 303 (1967).
40 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 25, at 2153-54. For cases acknowledging this congressional
intent, see United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 441 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
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is the detailed statutory procedure governing authorization and
supervision for this type of surveillance. 41 However, both the legislative history and the statute itself are silent as to acceptable methods
of installation of electronic listening devices and the requisite degree
of court supervision. 4"
There has been one amendment to Title III which has been interpreted as an acknowledgment by Congress of the necessity for
covert entry in order to install electronic listening devices. 43 This
provision states that "[a]n order authorizing the interception of...
oral communication shall . . . direct that a communication common
carrier, landlord, custodian or other person shall furnish the applicant
...all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the interception unobtrusively." 44 This amendment imposes no requirement for separate authorization for entry. Accordingly, some courts have reasoned that Congress, recognizing that the
nature of electronic eavesdropping requires covert installations, was
aware of, made provision for, and assumed the constitutionality of
surreptitious, forcible entry to carry out a court order authorizing
45
surveillance of oral communications.
The adoption of Title III has resulted in conflicting judicial decisions as to whether the statute permits covert and surreptitious entry
by law enforcement officials to carry out a surveillance order. In
order to appreciate the importance of Dalia, the conflicting case law
in this area must be understood.
concurring in the judgment); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972); United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 302; United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d at 457-58.
41 See notes 27 and 28 supra.

42 While methodology and supervisory responsibility are not directly addressed, there are
some indications in the legislative history that Congress was aware of the need for surreptitious

entry to install electronic listening devices. See 114 CONG. REc. 11598, 12989 (1968) (remarks of
Mr. Morse & Mr. Tydings).
43 In Dalia v. United States, the Court interpreted this amendment as an explicit confirmation of the legislative grant of power to authorize covert entry. 99 S. Ct. at 1690 n.10.

The district court in United States v. Ford interpreted this amendment as implying judicial
competence to authorize surreptitious entry. 414 F. Supp. at 883. However, the court of appeals refused to accept this interpretation and specifically declined to determine whether a
court could authorize surreptitious entry to install bugs. 553 F.2d at 151 n.20.
A contrary view was enunciated in Application of the United States where the court stated:
We cannot accept the suggestion that Congress, so clearly desirous of arming federal investigators with the power to eavesdrop, intended, without saying so, to forbid the surreptitious placement of devices which might be vital to the effective
exercise of that power.
563 F.2d at 643.
44 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4).
45 Dalia v. United States, 99 S. Ct. at 1690 n.1; United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d at 643
(Gurfein, C.J., concurring); United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. at 883.
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In United States v. Ford 46 the defendant had been indicted for
various narcotics offenses. 47 Evidence had been procured by installing an electronic listening device inside the Meljerveen Ltd. Shoe
Circus.4 8 Placement of the device was effected by means of a bomb
scare ruse.4 9 When the original device did not function properly, a
bomb scare ruse was again employed to re-enter and install additional
devices. 50 Although the judge had been apprised informally of the
means to be employed in entering the store, 51 the authorization did
not specify the method of entry nor limit the number of entries allowable. Instead, a blanket authorization to enter in any manner, in52
cluding breaking and entering, was contained in the court order.
The government contended that the authorization to enter was
merely surplusage 53 and that Title III implies authority to enter to
install electronic listening devices which have been authorized by
54
court order.
The lower court decided that 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) implies judicial
competence to authorize covert entry. 55 However, the provision in
the instant court order was considered overly broad and therefore
must fail, regardless of the actual supervision exercised by the
court.

56

In affirming the lower court decision, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia declined to decide whether the judiciary was
46 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
47 Id. at 150.
48 Id.
A court order authorizing electronic eavesdropping was obtained in accord with 23
D.C. Code §§ 541-556 (1973), which parallels 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. This court treated the
two statutes as one for purposes of legislative history. 553 F.2d at 148 n.4.
49 553 F.2d at 148-49. The court held that for purposes of the fourth amendment there is
no distinction between breaking and entering and a ruse entry. id. at 154 n.32.
50

Id. at 150.

51

Id.

at 148-50.

52 Id.

at 149-50. The relevant portion of the court order read:
(d) Members of the Metropolitan Police Department are hereby authorized to
enter and re-enter the Meljerveen Ltd. Shoe Circus . . . for the purpose of installing, maintaining and removing the electronic eavesdropping devices. Entry and reentry may be accomplished in any manner, including, but not limited to, breaking

and entering or other surreptitious entry, or entry and re-entry by ruse and
stratagem.

Id. (emphasis in original).
The court order issued in United States v. Agrusa would appear to be equally broad. 541
F.2d at 693. However, the Agrusa court affirmed the validity of the provision. Id. at 693.
53 553 F.2d at 153.

"I Id. at 158-59; accord, Dalia v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979); United States v.
Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 903 (1978). Contra, United States v.
Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978).
" 553 F.2d at 151 n.20; see note 43 supra.
56 553 F.2d at 152.
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competent to authorize covert entry. 57 The court then determined
that the fourth amendment required a bifurcated analysis, 58 subjecting both the overhearing and the entry to separate constitutional
scrutiny.5 9 Judge Skelly Wright, speaking for the court, reasoned
that the Constitution mandates prior judicial authorization for surreptitious entry onto private premises. 60 Historically, eavesdropping
had been permitted absent a physical trespass. 6 1 The trespass had
been considered to be the greater intrusion. 6 2 "Exclusion of verbal
evidence obtained by trespass vindicated only the right to be secure
from illegal governmental invasion of private premises." 63 The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Berger and Katz ex64
tended the protections of the fourth amendment to conversations.
57 Id. at 151 n.20. However, the court did note that the statutory language is susceptible to
the interpretation that, while merely technical trespasses such as a spike mike, see Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), may be authorized, surreptitious entry is not allowable. 553
F.2d at 151 n.20.
In order to accomplish the purposes of electronic surveillance, it is necessary that oral
communications listening devices be positioned unobtrusively. In Application of the United
States, the court held that to deny the courts the power to authorize surreptitious entry would
frustrate the underlying purposes of Title III. 563 F.2d at 642. Therefore, the judiciary was
considered competent to authorize entry, but the court order must nonetheless comport with
the requirements of the fourth amendment. Id. at 644; accord, United States v. Scafidi, 564
F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 903 (1978); United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d
690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977). Contra, United States v. Santora, 583
F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978).
In United States v. Santora, the court disagreed with the interpretation of the legislative
purpose relied on in Application of the United States. 583 F.2d at 458. Application of the
United States held that the dominant congressional purpose was crime control. 563 F.2d at 642.
Santora held that protection of privacy dominated. 583 F.2d at 458.
This question was ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Dalia
v. United States. The analysis employed in Application of the United States was endorsed by
the majority opinion. 99 S. Ct. at 1690-91. Four Justices dissented from this part of the opinion. Id. at 1694, 1696. In contrast to the majority, the dissenting Justices did not consider the
crime detection policy underlying Title III sufficient to justify the conclusion that the judiciary
has authority to authorize covert entry. Id. at 1704 n.33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A specific
legislative grant of power was considered necessary and its lack should be considered fatal. Id.
at 1704-05.
58 553 F.2d at 152. In Application of the Jinited States, the Fourth Circuit also recognized
two separate privacy interests. "Secretive physical trespass upon private premises for the purpose of planting a bug entails an invasion of privacy of constitutional significance distinct from,
though collateral to, that which attends the act of overhearing private conversations." 563 F.2d
at 643; accord, United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d at 696.
59 553 F.2d at 152-53.
60 Id. at 153-55.
61 Id. at 153; see note 15 supra.
62 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493, 498 (1958); United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d at 153.
63 553 F.2d at 153-54.
64 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 353; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 62-63. See note
36 supra.
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However, in so doing, the rule requiring judicial authorization for
physical invasion was not altered. 65 Therefore, separate and particular authorization was necessary for entry and the provision in the
66
court order was not surplusage.
The court then focused on the issue of reasonableness 6 7 in light
of the fourth amendment which prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures." 6 The government argued that the entry was reasonable
because it was made pursuant to a court order which complied with
Title 111.69 However, the court determined that covert entry necessarily involved a substantial incremental invasion of privacy and that
prior judicial authorization involved a relatively small burden on the

65 553 F.2d at 156-57; accord, United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d at 460.
66 553 F.2d at 154-55; accord, Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.
1977); United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045
(1977). Contra, United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 903
(1978). One commentator has argued strenuously against the necessity for separate and particular authorization for covert entry. See McNamara, The Problem Of Surreptitious Entry To Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops:How Do You ProceedAfter The Court Says "Yes"?, 15 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1 (1977).
67 553 F.2d at 158. Reasonableness alone is not sufficient to validate a search. Id. at 159
n.45. A warrant based on probable cause and issued by a "'neutral and detached magistrate" is
an additional requirement of constitutional magnitude. United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. at 315; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969).
Exceptions to the warrant requirement, absent consent, require exigent circumstances.
Analogy to entry onto private premises to execute an arrest warrant will not withstand analysis.
Arrest cases have usually been considered to involve exigent circumstances because of the possibility of flight or destruction of evidence. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 426-33
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967). However, the
Third Circuit has required a showing of exigency in addition to probable cause to validate entry
onto private premises for the purpose of arrest. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau,
502 F.2d 914, 928-29 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975). Consequently, since
exigent circumstances are unlikely in an eavesdropping situation, the analogy to arrest cases
must collapse. 553 F.2d at 159 n.45.
However, in United States v. Agrusa, the court reached a contrary conclusion. 541 F.2d at
696. In a somewhat tortured decision, unannounced entry to arrest was analogized to entry to
install electronic eavesdropping devices. Id. at 696-97. Although the court recognized the
necessity for a bifurcated analysis and separate authorization for covert entry, id. at 696, it failed
to subject the entry provision to a separate determination of reasonableness. See id. at 696-98.
Ultimately, the decision was based on both a lessened expectation of privacy in business premises and a direct analogy to arrest cases. Id. at 700. Somehow the particularity required by
Berger and Title III failed to capture the attention of the court and no distinction was perceived
between the destruction of existing evidence (arrest) and the creation of future evidence (eavesdropping). Id. at 701; see note 36 supra.
68U.S.CoNsT. amend. IV.
69 553 F.2d at 158-60. The court pointed out that, if this argument were to prevail, the
entry provision in the court order would again be surplusage. Id. at 160.
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law enforcement official. 70 The interposition of a "neutral and de71
tached magistrate" was, therefore, necessary for each entry.
Finally, the sufficiency of the court order was examined. 72 The
appellate court found that the showing of probable cause was insufficient to support the entry provision. 73 In reaching this conclusion,

Judge Skelly Wright was cognizant of the particularity required by
both Berger and Title III.74 Consequently, the provision was held to
be overbroad 75 and the results of the covert entry were suppressed
76
as mandated by statute.
The two most recent circuit court opinions in this area, United
States v. Santora77 and United States v. Finazzo,"8 have held that
Title III does not include, either expressly or impliedly, a grant of
authority to the courts to issue orders for surreptitious entry to install
electronic listening devices. 79 Therefore, any such entry violates the

Id. at 163-65.
In Agrusa, the court reached the opposite conclusion in evaluating the significance of the
interests involved. 541 F.2d at 697. The premises invaded were business premises which, the
court felt, were entitled to less fourth amendment protection than a home. Id. at 697. In
addition, the court found exigent circumstances of dimensions at least as substantial as those
obtaining in an arrest situation. Id.
Judge Skelly Wright in fact seemed particularly displeased with the government's contention that the "courts do not have the expertise necessary to weigh adequately the desirability
and feasibility of various methods of entry .
553 F.2d at 162; but see McNamara, supra
note 66.
71 553 F.2d at 165. Judicially created exceptions to the warrant requirement are usually
based on an overriding public interest. Id. at 162. The rationale for this requirement
rests primarily on the conception that it is for a judicial officer, and not the prosecutor or police, to determine whether the security of our society, which is essential to the maintenance of a rule of law, requires that the right of privacy yield to a
right of entry, search and seizure, and what limitation and specification of entry
may be appropriate and reasonable.
Id. at 163 (quoting Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S. App. D.C. 313, 317, 435 F.2d 385, 389
(1970)) (emphasis in original). The "convenience of the executing officers" is not sufficient justification for an exception to the warrant requirement. -553 F.2d at 163.
70

72 553 F.2d at 165.

73 Id. at 169. While the affidavits were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause
warranting covert entry, the breadth of the entry provision required a showing of probable
cause relating to the necessity for a grant of discretion to the law enforcement officers. Id.
74 Id. at 167--68.

75 Id. at 170.
76 Id. at 170-71; 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976).
77 United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978).
78 United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978).
79 United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d at 455; United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d at 838.
In Finazzo, the court stated:
We'hold that judges do not have the power under the 1968 wiretapping statute to
authorize breaking and entering in order to install electronic devices; and, in the
absence of specific statutory authority, they do not have the power under the
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fourth amendment and evidence obtained in this manner must be
suppressed. 80
United States v. Finazzo8 1 was an appeal from a lower court decision suppressing the fruits of electronic eavesdropping.8 2 A valid
Title III order had been obtained and the listening devices were installed by means of breaking and entering.8 In Finazzo, the Sixth
Circuit briefly reviewed the legislative history of Title III and noted
the congressional silence on the subject of installation of eavesdropping devices.8 4 Considering the stated legislative purpose of protection of privacy, the court concluded that "[i]t simply does not make
sense to imply congressional authority for official break-ins when not
a single line or word of the statute even mentions the possibility,
much less limits or defines" 8 5 the parameters of this authority. 86 In
addition, the Finazzo court believed that the difficulties inherent in
the unobtrusive installation of the electronic listening devices did not
raise an inference that authority to break and enter is subsumed in
the eavesdropping order. 8 7 Consequently, court-authorized surreptitious entry was not implicit in the statutory scheme. 88
Fourth Amendment. We also hold that federal law enforcement agents do not have
independent statutory or constitutional authority to engage in break-ins to install
eavesdropping devices. No statute gives federal judges the power to authorize
break-ins to plant eavesdrops; the judiciary does not have inherent power to delegate this authority to police officers; and police officers do not have that authority
independently.
583 F.2d at 838. Contra, Dalia v. United States, 99 S. Ct. at 1689-92.
80 United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d at 838; United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d at 466.
81 583 F.2d 837.
82

Id. at 838.

3 Id.
8 Id. at 839. In Finazzo, the court order did not specify the method of installation. Id. at
840. However, the government contended that the issuing judge was aware that forcible, surreptitious entry would be necessary. Id.
85 Id. at 841. This language was quoted with approval in Justice Stevens' dissent in Dalia v.
United States, 99 S. Ct. at 1698 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86 United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d at 841.
87 Id. The Second and Third Circuits seem to have reached an opposite conclusion on this
point. United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d at 1346; United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d at 640.
Essentially, the court in Finazzo is utilizing a bifurcated analysis, see note 58 supra, which
requires independent compliance with the requirements of the fourth amendment for each invasion of privacy. 583 F.2d at 841. A determination by the court that one privacy interest may be
invaded does not imply authority to invade independent but collateral privacy interests. Id. at
841-42.
88 583 F.2d at 840-42. In a separate concurrence, Judge Celebrezze disagreed with this
statutory interpretation. Id. at 850-51 (Celebrezze, J., concurring). He concluded that the
majority's reading of the statute was hypertechnical and that judicial competence to authorize
surreptitious entry exists. Id. However, Judge Celebrezze concurred in the decision because he
felt that the court order must contain express approval for entry. Id. at 850 (Celebrezze, J.,
concurring).
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The court then examined possible alternative sources of judicial
power to authorize break-ins. 8 9 An examination of the fourth
amendment and its history resulted in a holding that the judiciary is
not competent to issue orders authorizing break-ins in the absence of
a statute. 90 The court similarly rejected the contention that law enforcement officials can justify entry either under the exception for
exigent circumstances or by analogy to arrest cases. 9 1 Moreover, the
court declined the invitation to create an additional exception to the
warrant requirement in cases of Title III eavesdrops. 92
In Santora, the interception order contained a provision authorizing covert entry. 93 Bugs had been installed in business premises resulting in convictions for stolen airline ticket offenses. 94 The
Ninth Circuit recognized that Congress was aware of the problems of
entry associated with eavesdropping orders. 9 5 Accordingly, Judge
Hufstedler held that congressional silence on surreptitious entry must
be construed as a deliberate and knowing denial of power to the
courts to authorize covert entry. 96 Therefore, the entry provision in
the eavesdropping order was held to be invalid and the evidence thus
obtained was suppressed.97 The Santora court did not find it neces-

Id. at 842-48.
90 Id. at 844. The only statute that authorizes break-ins is 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970). Several
89

of the cases dealing with entry to install electronic listening devices have examined the applicability of this statutory authority. In Agrusa, the court concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 3109 applied
in all cases in which prior or contemporaneous announcement would defeat the purposes for the

entry. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d at 699. However, this construction has been criticized
as inconsistent with the wording of the statute and with the exigent circumstances envisioned by

the statute. United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d at 464; United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d at
847. See also, United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d at 151 n.21.
Judge Lay, dissenting in Agrusa, argued vehemently against the majority's characterization
of surreptitious entry as equivalent to exigent circumstances in arrest situations. 541 F.2d at 703

(Lay, J., dissenting). Apparently, three other judges in the Eighth Circuit agreed with Judge
Lay. See id. at 704 (Lay, J., dissenting).
91 583 F.2d at 846-47. Contra, United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977). Exigent circumstances are generally recognized "in the case of

the fleeing felon, the hostage and other life-endangering situations, and the threatened destruction of evidence." 583 F.2d at 846. See note 67 supra.
92 583 F.2d at 847-48. The argument that covert entry was a reasonable means of executing

an eavesdropping order and, therefore, in compliance with the fourth amendment, was again
rejected. Id. The court felt that the entry itself must be subjected to separate fourth amendment scrutiny because it involves invasion of a separate privacy interest. Id. at 848.

93 583 F.2d at 454.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 461.
96 Id. This position has not been adopted by any other circuit.
97 Id. at 466; 18 U.S.C. § 2515.

1979]

NOTES

sary to address the constitutional issues or to look for any alternative
sources of power which would permit the placement of electronic lis98
tening devices by forcible surreptitious entry.
99
In United States v. Scaftdi, the Second Circuit was confronted
with the issue of covert entry to carry out a valid Title III eavesdropping order.10 0 Unlike Santora, the court order authorizing the interception of oral communications contained no entry provision. 10 1 Citing United States v. Ford 102 and Senate Report No. 1097,103 the
court stated that "it is clear . . . that Congress intended to empower
courts to permit such entries .... "104 The remaining question was
the necessity for specific authorization.10 5 The court held that it was
"reasonable" to break and enter to place electronic listening devices. 10 6 No bifurcated analysis was employed and no independent
invasion of privacy was envisioned. 10 7 The Scafidi court held that
the method of entry and the number of entries were questions solely
within the purview of the law enforcement officials.' 0 8 Although the
fourth amendment was not directly considered, the opinion implied
that the fourth amendment is satisfied by a valid Title III order and

98 583 F.2d at 463. The entry itself was considered to be a violation of Title III. Suppression
is then required. 18 U.S.C. § 2515.
99 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 903 (1978).
100 Id. at 639. Scafidi involved multiple defendants convicted for gambling offenses. Id. at
636. Bugs were installed in an apartment and at a bar. Id. at 637. Before examining the issue of
covert entry the court addressed the standing issue. Id. at 638-39. Although ultimately the
court decided that it was unnecessary to decide the standing issue, id. at 639, there is some
dictum in this portion of the opinion recognizing a separate privacy interest in the premises
bugged. Id. at 638.
01 Id. at 639. However, a separate court order authorizing agents to re-enter the bar to
replace batteries in the eavesdropping equipment was obtained. Id. at 638.
102 Id. at 639. Here the court relied on the district court opinion in Ford without noting that
the circuit court specifically refused to affirm this portion of the opinion. See note 57 supra and
accompanying text.
503 See notes 36-42 supra and accompanying text.
104 564 F.2d at 639.
105 Id.
106 Id. Apparently, the court did not address the question of "reasonableness" in the fourth
amendment sense, but rather in the everyday sense of logical or justifiable.
107 Interception of oral communications was considered to be the primary invasion, and entry
to place bugs did not constitute a separate invasion. 564 F.2d at 640. Contra, United States v.
Ford, 553 F.2d at 158. See note 67 supra.
108 564 F.2d at 640. In reaching this conclusion the court commented that:
[O]nce a judicial officer is convinced by the facts presented to him that electronic surveillance will aid in the detection of crime, his authorization that it be
used should then transfer to the appropriate police agency the decision as to the
precise mechanical means whereby the order is to be carried out.
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that law enforcement personnel are subject to no additional prior restraints upon their actions.' 0 9
The Third Circuit in Dalia agreed with the reasoning in
Scafidi. 110 Since the circuit court opinion is simply an enthusiastic
affirmation of the district court,"' the opinion of the district court
must be scrutinized to determine the analytical basis for the holding
in this circuit. In the district court opinion, Judge Lacey stated initially that the silence of Title III regarding judicial supervision of surreptitious entry to install listening devices circumscribes the responsibility of the issuing judge. 112 Thereafter, the method of entry need
only be "reasonable." 113 Implicit in this statement is the assumption
that Congress was aware of the necessity for covert entry and chose
1 14
not to impose any prior restraints upon the executing officers.
Again a bifurcated analysis was not employed. Judge Lacey held that
the breaking and entering was not "unreasonable" as that term is
used in the fourth amendment and that the further requirements of
antecedent judicial scrutiny and a warrant were satisfied by the Title
115
III order.
Dalia v. United States presented the Supreme Court of the
United States with an opportunity to resolve a direct conflict in the
circuits concerning the interpretation and application of Title III and
to provide guidance for law enforcement personnel in a complex area
of fourth amendment interests. In affirming the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court addressed the questions of judicial competence to authorize covert entry and the necessity for court approval
116
and supervision of such entry.

Io
id. Accord, United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd, 575 F.2d 1344
(3d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979). Contra, United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978); Application of the United
States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
110 575 F.2d at 1346.

"I United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979).
112 426 F. Supp. at 865. Abdication of responsibility for supervision of entry by the judician
to law enforcement officials has been strongly criticized in other cases. United States v. Ford,
553 F.2d at 154-55; Application of the United States, 563 F.2d at 643-44.
13 426 F. Supp. at 865. The term "reasonable" was employed here in the same manner as in
Scafidi. See note 106 supra and accompanying text. Contra, United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d at
159 n.45; Application of the United States, 563 F.2d at 644-45.
'4 This assumption does not comport with the legislative history of Title III. Such a broad
grant of authority to law enforcement personnel would be expected to merit some congressional
debate. See notes 36-42 and 84-88 supra and accompanying text.
115 426 F. Supp. at 865-66. Here the terms "reasonable" and "efficient and convenient"
seem to become confused. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
16 99 S. Ct. at 1682.
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Initially, a unanimous Court decided that the fourth amendment
does not prohibit covert entry to install electronic listening devices
pursuant to a valid Title III eavesdropping order. 117 Implicit in this
determination was the constitutionality of Title III itself.,l x Surreptitious entry pursuant to a warrant had long been accepted in exigent
circumstances, such as arrest or possible destruction of evidence. 1 19
Recognizing no constitutionally valid distinction between an eavesdropping order and the exigent circumstances situations, x20 the Court
held that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se a covert
entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment." 121
While the majority opinion in Dalia conceded that there was no
explicit statutory authority for covert entry, 122 Justice Powell found
that "[t]he language, structure, and history of the statute" 123 all evidenced congressional intent "to approve electronic surveillance without limitation on the means necessary to its accomplishment, so long
as they are reasonable under the circumstances." 124 The majority
117

Id. at 1688-89, 1694, 1696.

118 Professor Spritzer, writing in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, argues against

electronic eavesdropping on both constitutional and policy grounds. Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance By Leave Of The Magistrate: The Case In Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 169 (1969).
This commentator finds that electronic surveillance is inconsistent with the fourth amendment's
requirement of particularity. Id. at 187-89. Necessarily, many conversations irrelevant to the
matter under investigation must be examined. Id. at 187. In concluding his article, Professor
Spritzer states:
[Nbo warrant procedure can confine an electronic surveillance to the predictable and
the relevant.
Basically, the justification offered by those who would legitimate electronic intrusion is the asserted need of our society to protect itself from lawlessness by the
most effective means available. But is it really to be supposed that the weaknesses
and deficiencies of a society in which crime and disorder have become rife will be
overcome by authorizing the nation's police officers to become insidious spies
monitoring the private conversations of the citizenry?
The Supreme Court has laid to rest the concept that the fourth amendment is
violated only when there is a physical trespass, but . . . has encouraged the notion
.. . that both one's premises and one's privacy of communication may be secretly
invaded if only a magistrate nods. . . . [A] decent and civilized society should provide some area in which the privacy of the individual is inviolate and he is free to
communicate as he pleases without fear of the state's intrusion.
Id. at 201.
119 99 S. Ct. at 1688. See note 67 supra.
120 99 S. Ct. at 1688-89.
121 Id. at 1689.
122
123

Id.
Id.

124 Id. This would mean that Congress intended to allow law enforcement personnel broad
discretion regarding the method of implementation.
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contended that the fleeting recognition of the physical difficulties inherent in eavesdrops and the lack of a specific prohibition against
covert entry supported this intent.' 2 5 Congressional awareness of the
frequent necessity for surreptitious entry to install electronic listening
devices, 126 coupled with the enactment of Title III authorizing electronic surveillance, were considered additional strong evidence of this
intent. 12 7 The majority concluded that silence may be equated with
congressional approval of covert entry 128 and that, in light of the
comprehensive nature of the statutory scheme, this prohibition would
have been made explicit. 129 Moreover, a denial of competence to
authorize covert entry would undermine the congressional purpose in
the enactment of Title 111.130

125Id. at 1690-91. The debate over Title III covers many pages of the Congressional Record.
However, in those hours of debate there is no direct reference to the acceptable method of
installation of electronic listening devices. Perhaps the most specific mention appears in the
remarks of Senator Tydings, 114 CONG. REc. 12988-89 (1968), cited by both the majority and
the dissent in Dalia. 99 S. Ct. at 1691 (Powell, J., writing for the majority), 1701 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Senator Tydings' remarks were designed to allay the fears of some of the opponents
of Title III. It is certainly arguable that his remark concerning the difficulty and, often, impossibility of installing electronic listening devices does not constitute evidence of congressional intent.
126 99 S. Ct. at 1690-91. The Court does not cite any congressional remarks, except those of
Senator Tydings, see note 125 supra, to support this statement. Instead, attention is directed to
Senate Hearings on other legislation. 99 S. Ct. at 1690.
127 99 S.

Ct. at 1690-91.
128 Id. at 1691. In rejecting the possibility that Congress did not intend to authorize covert

entry, the Court stated:
the language and history of Title III convey . . . [an] explanation for Congress'
failure to distinguish between surveillance that requires covert entry and that which
does not. Those considering the surveillance legislation understood that, by authorizing electronic interception of oral communications in addition to wire communications, they were necessarily authorizing surreptitious entries.
Id.
129 id.
130 Id. at 1691-92. The Court states that Title III was enacted to combat crime. Id. at 1691.
An examination of S. REP. No. 1097, the source upon which the majority relies, 99 S. Ct. at
1691 n.13, reveals that the purposes of Title III were both crime control and protection of the
privacy of conversation. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 25, at 2153-54; see also notes 37-39
supra and accompanying text. The report makes special mention of the problems which had
resulted from the undisciplined use of electronic surveillance.
Commercial and employer-labor espionage is becoming widespread. It is becoming increasingly difficult to conduct business meetings in private. Trade secrets
are betrayed. Labor and management plans are revealed. No longer is it possible,
in short, for each man to retreat into his home and be left alone. Every spoken
word relating to each man's personal, marital, religious, political, or commercial
concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor and turned against the speaker to
the auditor's advantage.
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens refused to accept this
argument, interpreting silence as evidence of lack of congressional
consideration of this aspect of implementation. 13 1 Indeed, it would
appear from the scope of the statute, the legislative history, and the
prior case law that the majority's interpretation of this silence lacks a
32
firm foundation. 1
Having decided that Title III authorized covert entry, the court
proceeded to consider the necessity for specific judicial authorization. 1 33 The majority determined that the instant eavesdropping
order complied with the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. 134 Since the method of execution of a warrant is generally

S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 25, at 2154.
It is interesting to note that at the time of enactment of Title III there was some debate
concerning the effectiveness of eavesdropping as a means of crime control. Note, supra note 37,
at 657-61. Although the majority of officials and commentators strongly endorsed electronic
surveillance, id. at 657, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark was among the dissenters. In
fact, Clark's argument was based on an invasion of privacy as the following statement illustrates:
"Nothing so mocks privacy as the wiretap and electronic surveillance. They are incompatible
with a free society." 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.

NEWS 2112, 2232-33.

131 99 S. Ct. at 1701 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens began his discussion of this
issue by stating:
Only one relevant conclusion can be drawn from a review of the entire legislative history of Title III. The legislators never even considered the possibility that
they were passing a statute that would authorize federal agents to break into private
premises without any finding of necessity by a neutral and detached magistrate.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 The majority's position in Dalia is based on the concept of one invasion of privacy. 99 S.
Ct. at 1693-94. If the interception of conversations and the installation of the necessary equipment violate only one privacy interest, the eavesdropping order should validate breaking and
entering absent a specific statutory prohibition.
The dissenting Justices and several of the circuit courts, have disagreed with this view of
the fourth amendment. In these opinions the physical invasion of private premises has been
considered to be an additional intrusion upon the individual's privacy and, as such, entitled to
separate fourth amendment protection. 99 S. Ct. at 1695 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Application of the United States, 563 F.2d at 643; United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d at 157-58; United
States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d at 696.
Justice Stevens' dissent pointed out that, even when conversations were not afforded fourth
amendment protection, any physical invasion necessary to capture the conversation was considered violative of the constitutional standard. 99 S. Ct. at 1703 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See note
15 supra. Breaking and entering violated the fourth amendment while eavesdropping did not.
99 S. Ct. at 1703 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Today, as a result of the decision in Dalia, an
eavesdropping order is sufficient to cover both areas and no separate legally cognizable invasion
of privacy results from the entry. Id. at 1694.
133 99 S. Ct. at 1692.
134 Id. at 1693. The majority opinion adopted a narrow view of the particularity required by

both the fourth amendment and by Berger. Id. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
One commentator, in discussing the constitutionality of Title III and the fourth amendment's particularity requirement has reached the conclusion that "as the techniques for effec-
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within the province of law enforcement officials "subject . . . to the
general Fourth Amendment protection 'against unreasonable searches
and seizures,"' 135 the bifurcated analysis employed in several of the
lower court decisions 136 was rejected as too great a refinement of the
concept of fourth amendment interests. 13 7 In substance, the majority
considered breaking and entering to implant electronic listening devices pursuant to a valid Title III order to be equivalent to the manner of execution of the eavesdropping order rather than an additional
and separate invasion of privacy. 138 This resulted in no requirement
of antecedent judicial approval. 13 9 The only constitutional question
was one of reasonableness of execution which may be determined
40
after the entry.1
Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
was particularly concerned with the majority's failure to recognize two
separate privacy interests. 14 ' The majority stated that "[o]ften in
executing a warrant the police may find it necessary to interfere with
privacy rights not explicitly considered by the judge who issued the
warrant." 142 The Court made reference to arrest and forcible entry
situations; 143 however, these situations are distinguishable. In all of
the cases cited by the majority, exigent circumstances, which could
not readily be anticipated, existed.'" In contrast, exigency is not a

tuating the search becomes more efficient, resulting in a higher probability of innocent objects
coming within the ken of police officers, the specificity of what is allowed to be observed and
seized must likewise increase." Note, supra note 37, at 676. This author finds the opportunity
of observation constitutionally repugnant, a position with which the Court in Dalia did not
agree. Id.
135 99 S. Ct. at 1693.
136 See notes 58-66 supra and accompanying text.
137 99 S. Ct. at 1693-94.
138 Id.
139

Id.

140

Id.

at 1694.

Id. at 1694-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1694 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14 Id. In fact the obvious implication is that there is no distinction between eavesdropping
orders and arrest warrants.
144 United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 U.S. 1123 (1977),
involved the arrest pursuant to a warrant of a suspect at the home of another person. 545 F.2d
at 412-13. The police agents did not enter the home until the suspect received an oral warning
of the presence of the police. Id. at 413. This was a situation which was not readily anticipated
and constituted exigent circumstances. Id."
In United States v. Brown, 556 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1977), police officers entered an unoccupied building to execute a search warrant. Id. at 305. The scope of the search was not enlarged by this entry.
141

142
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characterisic of an eavesdropping situation. As a matter of fact, a certain amount of advance planning is necessary to unobtrusively implant
electronic listening equipment. Law enforcement personnel are
necessarily sufficiently aware of the contemplated method of installation to obtain prior judicial approval. Finally, this would not infringe
on the law enforcement officers' freedom in carrying out the order. 145 A general provision authorizing the entry would meet the
constitutional standard and the method of effecting the entry would
46
remain within the discretion of the law enforcement personnel.1
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. 147 The issue considered in this opinion was
"whether this kind of power [to break and enter] should be read into
a statute that does not expressly grant it." 148 In rejecting this interpretation, Justice Stevens, considering both the structure and his49
tory of the statute, found no support for the majority's position. 1
Moreover, the "duty [of the Supreme Court] to protect the rights of
the individual" 150 sufficiently outweighed "the interest in more effective law enforcement" 151 to constitute an additional basis for rejecting
the government's position.1 52 Justice Stevens argued that it is generally the province of Congress to balance privacy interests and law
enforcement efficiency. 153 Therefore, when Congress has expressly
enacted legislation circumscribing the relationship between an inva-

United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1973), was another case in which a search

warrant had been executed while the premises were unoccupied. Id. at 41. Both Gervato and
Brown involved lack of notice. In breaking and entering to install electronic listening devices
the problem is one of the scope of the search.
145 99 S. Ct. at 1695 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1696 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I" id.
149 Id. at 1696-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The detailed provisions which Congress included
in Title III suggested that Congress did not intend to allow law enforcement officials to exercise
discretion in wiretapping or eavesdropping situations. Id. at 1700 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The

dissent argued that broad discretionary power is inconsistent with the procedural requirements
embodied in the statute. Id. at 1700-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens found no support for the majority's reading of the legislative history. Id. at
1701 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Stevens did find that the legislative history indicated a concern with strict controls on the process of wiretapping and eavesdropping, a concern
which would be inconsistent with authorization of covert entry by silence. Id. at 1702 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
150 Id.

at 1696 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

151 Id.
152 Id.
15 Id. at 1697 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sion of privacy and an investigatory technique, the courts ought to
respect this determination. 154 Absent specific congressional authorization, however, federal intrusions on privacy deserve no special
consideration and are, in fact, illegal.' 5 5 Finally, the dissenting Justices voiced their discomfort with the power which the majority opinion would presumably vest in the national police force. 156 Since
Congress did not explicitly grant this power, the dissent concluded
57
that the constitution requires that this authority be denied.1
Entry onto the premises of another without consent or judicial
authorization is tortious and illegal. The fourth amendment was
158
enacted to prohibit such non-consensual or warrantless entries.
The problem in eavesdropping orders involves judicial competence to
authorize surreptitious entry and the scope of the order that is issued.
In Dalia, the Supreme Court decided that congressional silence may
signify a grant of authority. 159 Failure to prohibit covert entry is
equated with authority to engage in covert entry. 160 However, as
the dissent stated, silence may just as readily be construed as denying
authority. 16 1 Physical invasion of one's home or place of business is
an intrusion of different dimensions than eavesdropping. 162 Although
the Supreme Court has decided that these other dimensions may be
protected by a subsequent determination of reasonableness of the
method of carrying out the eavesdropping order,' 6 3 Title III itself
does not, by its silence, form a firm basis for this holding.
The history of the fourth amendment is replete with instances of
judicial disapproval of physical invasions absent authorization. 164 The
majority assumes a broad grant of power to law enforcement person-

154 Id. However, the deference accorded to Congress was not claimed to be absolute. Id.
155 Id. at 1697 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The intrusions involved in electronic surveillance
would be illegal if no warrant existed. The dissent pointed out that the decision in Dalia legitimated an illegal act engaged in pursuant to a warrant. However, no judicial determination of

probable cause in relation to the illegal act, covert entry, was required. The only determination
of probable cause related to the eavesdropping. Id. at 1697-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 1704-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157

Id.

158 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 53; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at
528.
159 99 S. Ct. at 1689-92.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1697-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 This kind of invasion exposed the contents of one's home or business premises to scrutiny.

Indeed, in Dalia, a search of the entire premises was conducted. See note 9 supra.
163 99 S. Ct. at 1694.

16

See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347

(1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
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NOTES

nel, limited only by the express restraints in Title 111.165 However,
Congress may have intended any of several alternatives. First, as the
dissent suggests, Congress may simply never have considered the
problem of entry. 16 6 This would seem to argue against the majority's
position. The power to legislate should not be assumed by the courts.
Secondly, Congress may have intended to permit electronic eavesdropping only in situations where an additional invasion of privacy
was not necessary. Thirdly, Congress may have agreed with the
majority opinion. Rather than attempting to interpret congressional
silence in light of scanty legislative history regarding covert entry, the
Court should have refused to enlarge on Title III and awaited congressional action on this matter.
Power to effect entry, pursuant to a valid Title III eavesdropping
order, in any reasonable manner vests law enforcement personnel
with discretion far in excess of that necessary to perform their function. While the judiciary cannot be expected to oversee every detail
of the installation of the electronic equipment, a judicial determination of the necessity for covert entry would seem to be neither unreasonable nor burdensome. Surely the courts are capable of making
this determination. To leave this to the discretion of law enforcement
personnel seems to be abandoning the judicial function of evaluating
the relative desirability of the protection of individual privacy and the
public interest in effective law enforcement.
Mary A. Powers

185
166

See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
99 S. Ct. at 1701 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

